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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Florida became the first state to enact a statutory ban on
adoptions by gay or lesbian adults.' The statute provides that "[n]o per-
son eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is homo-
sexual."2 This blanket exclusion went unchallenged until 1991, when in
Seebol v. Farie a circuit court ruled the statute unconstitutional under
both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution.3 Two
years later, however, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the
statute was constitutional.4 The Supreme Court of Florida considered
the constitutionality of the statute for the first time in the 1995 case of
Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.5
In 1991, James W. Cox and Rodney M. Jackman, seeking to adopt
a special needs child,6 attempted to enroll in pre-adoption parenting
1. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1995).
2. Id. New Hampshire has a similar blanket exclusion which applies to both adoption and
foster parenting. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (Supp. 1989).
3. See Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. 1991), reprinted in Dep't of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services did not appeal the decision, however, so the ruling applied
in Monroe County only.
4. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1993). For an account of the Second District Court of Appeal's decision and an examination
of the statutory ban's compatibility with the "best interests of the child" standard, see Matt
Lepore, Note, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox: Is Florida's Statute in the
Child's Best Interests?, 45 MERCER L. RV. 1415 (1994).
5. See Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
6. A special needs child is one considered difficult to place because of racial background,
physical or mental disability, or age. 656 So. 2d at 902.
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classes through the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS") in Sarasota, Florida. In response to a question on the
state adoption form, Cox and Jackman disclosed their homosexuality,
and HRS immediately rejected their application based on Section
63.042(3). 7 Cox filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Section
63.042(3), alleging that the statute violated the right of privacy, equal
protection and due process under the Florida Constitution.'
The trial court, relying heavily upon the 1991 Seebol decision, held
the statute void for vagueness and violative of the right of privacy and
equal protection and entered summary judgment in favor of Cox. 9 The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that plaintiffs evi-
dence was insufficient to support summary judgment, the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague with respect to the term "homosexual," and that
the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees of privacy, due pro-
cess, or equal protection.' ° The Supreme Court of Florida approved the
district court's decision that HRS was entitled to summary judgment on
the issues of right of privacy and due process, and that the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague, but remanded for further proceedings on
the equal protection issue."
This Casenote examines both the appellate court and supreme court
decisions,' 2 and addresses the legal and sociological issues presented in
Cox. Part I provides background on adoption and the significance of the
Cox decision. Part II discusses the legislative history of Florida's gay
exclusion statute. Part III examines social science research regarding
the effects of homosexual parenting on children, and the compatibility of
Florida's blanket exclusion with the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard. Part IV analyzes the constitutional claims presented to the court.'3
7. See id. at 903.
8. See 656 So. 2d at 903; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, Section 23; art. I, Section 9; art. I,
Section 2. While plaintiffs relied entirely on the Florida Constitution, the courts looked to the
United States Constitution as well.
9. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.
2d DCA 1993); Final Judgment, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Case No. 91-
3491 CA-01 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1991).
10. See 627 So. 2d at 1210.
11. See Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
12. The supreme court majority, while approving the appellate court's decision on all but the
equal protection issue, engaged in no analysis from which to determine its reasoning. Rather, the
majority seemingly adopted the reasoning of the appellate court.
13. For a discussion of the equal protection claims under the United States Constitution, see
Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1985); Harris M. Miller II, An Argument for the
Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality,
57 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 797 (1984); see also supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
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II. PART I: BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
Historically, adoption served to provide otherwise homeless or
unwanted children with a traditional family structure. 4 While "tradi-
tional" once meant married couples, over the years courts and agencies
began permitting single persons to adopt. Courts usually perform a bal-
ancing of potentially competing purposes-protection of family integ-
rity and protection of children.' 5
Adoptions of minor children by lesbian and gay adults fall into two
major categories: (1) stranger adoptions in which the biological parents'
rights are terminated, and (2) second parent or co-parent adoptions in
which a second person becomes a legal parent without terminating the
biological parents' rights.16 Stranger adoptions, like the one sought by
Cox, occur most often when biological parents are unable or unwilling
to provide for a child and an adoptive parent intervenes to provide that
child a home. 7 Second parent adoptions are most often pursued by
couples who wish to raise a child together; one is already the legal or
biological parent, and the couple seeks legal recognition of the other's
relationship to the child.' A few courts in other jurisdictions have
approved stranger and second parent adoptions by gay and lesbian
adults.19
The purpose of the Florida Adoption Act is "to protect and promote
the well-being of persons being adopted and their natural and adoptive
parents and to provide all children who can benefit by it a permanent
family life."' 20 The overriding question in Cox became whether this pur-
pose was compatible with Florida's blanket exclusion of gay and lesbian
adults from even being considered to adopt a child. The case presented
significant issues of first impression to both the Second District Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida.
The case is significant because many gay and lesbian adults in Flor-
ida want to adopt and because of the growing number of children in
HRS custody awaiting placement. Currently, HRS has 1,523 special-
needs children available for adoption, with 1/3 of these in search of fam-
ilies and the others likely to be adopted by relatives, family friends or
14. See, e.g., In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1984).
15. See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child:
A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 64 (1995).
16. Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Perspective, 2 Durr J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 191 (Spring 1995).
17. See id. at 195.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990); In re Adoption of a
Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
20. FLA. STAT. § 63.022 (1995).
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foster parents.21 Special-needs children often come into the system after
being abused, neglected or abandoned. Such children could certainly
benefit from a "permanent family life," 22 but the Florida Legislature has
decided through Section 63.042(3) that gay and lesbian adults cannot
adequately provide them this life.
III. PART II: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 63.042(3)
In 1977, the Florida legislature enacted the gay exclusion statute.23
During discussion of the proposed bill, one senator commented that the
legislature lacked evidence of any problems presented by gay and les-
bian adoptions, and that without such demonstrable evidence, legislators
should question the wisdom of adopting the blanket exclusion. 24 Specif-
ically, the senator noted that the bill proclaimed that there were legiti-
mate reasons to exclude homosexuals, but failed to state those reasons or
provide the support for them. In addition, the bill singled out only one
group as being potentially dangerous to children.25
The senator pointed out that the adoption statute already provided
numerous safeguards for screening applicants 26 and that the legislature
should not "start discrimination.127 The senator defined the issue as not
whether homosexuality is normal, but as whether there was sufficient
understanding of the behavior to justify legislatively-mandated stigmati-
zation and discrimination.
Another senator described the bill as "ridiculous" and indicative of
the "irrationality of the legislature. 28 The senator criticized the legisla-
ture for attempting to specifically categorize who should not adopt:
[Ihf you're going to say sexual deviants ought not to adopt then
you've got to go through the statutes and include all acts of sexual
deviation that have been singled out for criminal acts .... The first
21. See Marlene Sokol, Case of Gay Adoption Unresolved, ST. PEaT. TiMEs, April 28, 1995,
at B4. While the plaintiffs in Cox sought to adopt a special-needs child, this Note's author does
not mean to suggest that gay or lesbian adults cannot "parent" other children.
22. FLA. STAT. § 63.022 (1995).
23. One commentator asserts that the statute was the direct result of an anti-gay crusade in
Miami characterized as a "save the children" movement, but does not explain the movement's
impetus. Peter Freiberg, Letter from Miami: Fighting Florida's Adoption Ban, WASH. BLADE,
March 19, 1993, at 5.
24. See FLA. S. JouR., 1977 Org. Sess. at 370-71.
25. See id. (criticizing the legislature's attempt to "get in the business of discriminating").
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.092 (1995) (mandating a preliminary study to determine
suitability of the intended placement); FLA. STAT. § 63.125 (1995) (requiring a complete
investigation of the proposed adoptive home after a petition to adopt is filed with the court); FLA.
STAT. § 63.142 (1995) (granting courts permission to order additional "observation, investigation,
or consideration" before ruling on a petition for adoption).
27. FLA. S. JoUR., 1977 Org. Sess. at 370-71.
28. Id.
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question you ought to ask yourself is why pick out just one form of
sexual deviation and say that that particular person cannot adopt ....
[T]he real ridiculousness of this type of statute is that we ought not be
sitting up here as legislators and making... domestic decisions relat-
ing to the custody of [sic] welfare of children that ought to be decided
on an individual case by case basis .... Otherwise, it's not a rational
bill.29
Despite the lack of empirical studies or legislative fact-finding
regarding the harms of adoption by gay or lesbian adults, the legislature
enacted the blanket exclusion. As the senator observed, however, the
bill appears to have had nothing to do with adoption and everything to
do with discrimination against homosexuals. 30
IV. PART III: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE "BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" STANDARD
Since the early 1970s there has been a proliferation of social sci-
ence research regarding parental (homo)sexuality and its affect on chil-
dren. Such research is often used in gay rights cases3' to address
societal and judicial preconceptions. Such fears and misconceptions
include: the greater risk of the homosexual parent molesting the child;
32
the child becoming homosexual; 33 the child suffering societal stigma;
34
the child contracting AIDS;35 and the child suffering harm to his/her
psychosocial development.36
There are three major areas of social science research regarding the
impact on children of parental sexual orientation. The first examines the
child's social relationships with peers and adults.37 The second deals
29. Id.
30. See FLA. S. JOUR., 1977 Org. Sess. at 370-71.
31. See Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights Cases: The
Synergistic Influences of Historical Context, Justificatory Citation, and Dissemination Efforts, 41
WAYNE L. REv. 1, 6 (1994) (demonstrating that a disproportionally large number of gay rights
opinions cite or refer to social science research). In her article, Falk provides three reasons for
this: (1) greater acceptance of social science information generally in modem legal culture, (2)
courts' inclination to cite social science research for justificatory reasons, and (3) concerted efforts
by groups and litigants to provide such information to the courts. Id. at 7. The article notes,
however, that because of judicial homophobia, the rate of citation often depends on the litigants'
ability to persuade the courts that existing myths about homosexuality are indeed false. Id. at 37.
32. See Note, Joint Adoption: A Queer Option?, 15 VT. L. REv. 197, 207 (1990); Shaista-
Parven Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1009, 1013 (1989).
33. See Ali, supra note 32, at 1013; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay
Parents, 63 CILD DEV. 1025, 1029 (1992).
34. See Note, supra note 32, at 208; Ali, supra note 32, at 1013.
35. See Ali, supra note 32, at 1013.
36. See Note, supra note 32, at 209; Patterson, supra note 33, at 1029.
37. See Patterson, supra note 16, at 200. Judicial concern about children's social
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with the child's personal or psychosocial development.38 Finally,
research on sexual identity broadly encompasses an individual's gender
identity, gender-role behavior and sexual orientation.3 9 Gender identity
is the early-emerging concept of being male or female." Gender-role
behavior includes those behaviors traditionally considered masculine or
feminine. Sexual orientation is the later-emerging erotic preference
for males, females or both. 2
In Cox, HRS asserted that the state's interests in maintaining the
homosexual exclusion were that adopted children have appropriate role
models, and that children not become homosexual as a result of adop-
tion.43 After reviewing the social science evidence presented by both
sides, the trial court judge granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
determining that plaintiffs' "unrebutted and overwhelming" evidence
proved that there was no potential danger to children from homosexual
parenting which would justify the blanket exclusion. 4 The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs'
evidence, consisting of research reports in magazines and journals and
supplemented by law review articles,45 was insufficient. 6
The Second District Court of Appeal found that of the evidence in
the record, there were only "two major scientific articles. 47 The court
discounted one of these because the record contained no information
regarding the author's credentials and the article focused on natural chil-
relationships also relates to concern about the adopted children being teased by their peers due to
their parents' sexual orientation. Id.
38. See Patterson, supra note 16, at 199. Such studies focus on things such as low self-
esteem, adjustment problems, and psychiatric disorders. Id.
39. See Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay Adults: The Use and Mis-use of
Social Science Research, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 207, 212 (1995); Patterson, supra note
34, at 1030-31.
40. See Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual
Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Final Judgment, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Case No. 91-3491
CA-01 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1991). at 7.
44. Id. at 3.
45. The evidence included: Marcia Barinaga, Is Homosexuality Biological?, SCIENCE, August
30, 1991, at 956; Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1993,
at 47; Mary B. Harris and Paulene J. Turner, Gay and Lesbian Parents, 12 J. HoMosExurrY 191
(1985/86); Constance Holden, Twin Study Links Genes to Homosexuality, SCIENCE, January 3,
1992, at 33; Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, SCIENCE, August 30, 1991, at 1034; Patterson, supra note 33, at 1025; Michael
Ruse, Are There Gay Genes?, 6 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 5 (1981).
46. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1212-13
(Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
47. Id. at 1213.
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dren of homosexuals.4 8 The other was rejected for various reasons,
including that the article contained a sample of "only twenty-three
homosexual parents and sixteen heterosexual parents," the homosexual
households were located in New Mexico, there was no information on
the expertise of the two professors who reported the study, and no infor-
mation on the "professional reputation and objectivity" of the journal
which published the survey. 49 The court discounted other articles
because "[no] showing was made that these articles would be the type of
data reasonably relied upon by experts... and no expert witnesses were
called to discuss or explain these reports. '50 The court of appeals con-
demned this practice of "trial by photocopy," and concluded that the trial
court lacked the training and expertise to evaluate and apply the scien-
tific studies.5
However, both parties at the trial level waived an evidentiary hear-
ing and had stipulated to this common practice for presenting evidence
to the court. HRS raised no objection to any of plaintiffs' submissions.
Further, contrary to the court's conclusion, the social science literature
in the record was straightforward, relevant and compelling. While all of
the studies cited by the parties focused on the natural children of homo-
sexuals, a reasonable analogy can be drawn from this research to
adopted children of homosexuals.
The first major scientific article reviewed 15 years of systematic
research regarding the personal and social development of children with
gay and lesbian parents, summarized the findings of these studies, and
concluded that no evidence suggested that homosexual parents compro-
mised the development of children in any respect.52
Despite long-standing legal presumptions against gay and lesbian
parents in many states, despite dire predictions about their children
based on well-known theories of psychosocial development, and
despite the accumulation of a substantial body of research investigat-
ing these issues, not a single study has found children of gay or les-
bian parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative




51. See id. (stating there were mixed questions of law and fact, requiring an evidentiary
hearing). Interestingly, the appellate court then proceeded to rule on the constitutional questions
and examine the social science information, and even concluded that HRS was entitled to
summary judgment. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Cox argued that the appellate
court abused its authority and that the case should have been remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Initial Brief for Petitioner, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1995), at 45.
52. See Patterson, supra note 33, at 1025.
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gests that home environments provided by gay and lesbian parents
are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to support and
enable children's psychosocial growth. 3
The other scientific article criticized by the appellate court54 was
actually submitted by HRS. The study, while acknowledging the need
for further research, 5 found no significant difference in the relationships
of homosexual and heterosexual parents with their children. 6 It con-
cluded that results "suggest that being gay is not incompatible with
effective parenting. '57 This conclusion is consistent with a study sub-
mitted by plaintiffs which reported that children raised by homosexual
parents "do not differ appreciably from children raised in more conven-
tional family settings. 58 Plaintiffs also submitted a study on gays as
role models that differentiated between myths and realities of gay role
models by examining children's sexual identity formation 9.5  The study
concluded that "[p]arents' sexual preference appears to have no negative
effect on children, and children of gays are no more likely than other
children to have emotional problems, adopt opposite-sex-typed behav-
iors, or become gay themselves."6
In addition to the studies in the record, more current research sup-
ports the trial court's conclusion that homosexual parents per se are no
more damaging to children, whether natural or adopted, than heterosex-
ual parents.6 1 In fact, no current research supports the view that homo-
sexual parents threaten a child's well-being. Overall, existing research
suggests that home environments provided by gay and lesbian parents
are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to support and
enable psychological, emotional and social growth in children.
Social science research clearly does not support a per se exclusion
53. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
54. See Harris & Turner, supra note 45.
55. See id. at 112.
56. See id. at 111.
57. Id. at 112.
58. See Green, supra note 40, at 696.
59. See Dorothy I. Riddle, Relating to Children: Gays as Role Models, 34 J. Soc. IssuEs 38,
39 (1978).
60. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
61. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 16, at 198-99 (concluding that of twelve studies examining
over 300 children of homosexual parents, not one provides evidence for concern); Elovitz, supra
note 40, at 213 (concluding that the scientific consensus is that sexual orientation is not within
social or parental control); Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent
Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers, 18 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 123, 134 (1989) (concluding that despite the studies' limited sample size, data
suggests that growing up in a lesbian household does not in and of itself negatively impact an
adolescent's self-esteem).
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on the adoption of minor children by gay and lesbian adults.62 Further,
research supports the conclusion that such a blanket exclusion is incom-
patible with the standard for making determinations whether to allow an
adoption-the best interests of the child.63 The Florida Adoption Act
mandates that the "best interests" test be used in any adoption proceed-
ing.64 Under this test, a court or agency considering an adoption petition
is given broad discretion to determine what is in the child's best inter-
ests.65 Such an approach seems consistent with the overall purpose of
the Florida Adoption Act, yet contrary to Florida's blanket exclusion
which removes an entire category of persons from the pool of prospec-
tive parents, even if they are fully eligible in all other respects.66
The central tenet of the "best interests" standard is case-by-case
consideration of the individual circumstances relating to a particular
child and its potential adoptive parent. Irrebuttable presumptions such
as Florida's gay exclusion seem incompatible with this individualized
approach. 7 Previously discussed research68 supports the notion that
case-by-case consideration of a homosexual potential adoptive parent's
application to adopt is a better approach than a per se exclusion.
V. PART IV: CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Cox raised three issues under the Florida Constitution. The Second
District Court of Appeal held that the statute did not violate constitu-
tional guarantees of right of privacy, due process, or equal protection.69
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed except as to equal protection and
remanded on this issue alone.70 This section examines the courts' rea-
soning on the constitutional claims.
62. See Huggins, supra note 61, at 134 (stating that a parent's sexual orientation is not a valid
criterion upon which to base child disposition questions).
63. See Note, supra note 32; Ali, supra note 32, at 1010.
64. See FLA. STAT. § 63.022(2)(1) (1995).
65. See In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1984) (holding constitutional a
statute providing that all adoption proceeding hearings be held in closed court, partly because of
the rationale that in adoption proceedings, the court's primary duty is to serve the best interests of
the child) (citing In re Adoption of M.A.H., 411 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)).
66. See Initial Brief for Petitioner, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So.
2d 902 (Fla. 1995), at 45.
67. To increase the likelihood that individualized determinations are always made, some
commentators have advocated use of a nexus test, which requires empirical evidence of an adverse
effect on the child and which shifts the focus away from the prospective parents' sexual
orientation and toward the needs of the child and the prospective parents' ability to meet those
needs. See, e.g., Ali, supra note 32, at 1038.
68. See supra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
69. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215-20
(Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The constitutional claims were extensively addressed in the 26-page ruling,
both under the United States and Florida Constitutions.
70. See Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).
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A. Right of Privacy
In 1980, Florida became the fourth state to create an express pri-
vacy provision in its constitution.71 The provision defines privacy as the
right to be let alone,7 2 and expresses the individual's power to define the
boundaries of his/her private life. 73 It also establishes a correlative limi-
tation on the state's power to encroach that boundary by attempting to
standardize behavior or identity.74 The provision was meant to protect
against increasing collection, retention and use of information relating to
all facets of an individual's personal life, providing broader protection
than its implicit federal counterpart. However, commentators have
questioned its effectiveness in protecting individual interests.75
The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly declared that Flor-
ida's right of privacy is a fundamental right and, once implicated, the
challenged law will be reviewed under the compelling state interest or
"strict scrutiny" standard.76 In Cox, the Second District concluded that,
although the Florida Constitution contains this explicit right of privacy,
the homosexual exclusion provision "does not establish a governmental
intrusion into a person's life."7 7 The court stated that Cox "voluntarily
admitted" to HRS that he was gay. The court reasoned that if plaintiffs
voluntarily admitted their homosexuality, they could not claim a reason-
able expectation of privacy; therefore, the right of privacy was not
implicated.78
The court overlooked, however, that the disclosure was in response
to a direct question on the adoption form. In fact, the parties stipulated
that HRS asked plaintiffs their sexual orientation during the application
process.79 Cox challenged the constitutionality of asking the question,
71. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A
Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REv. 693 (1990) (surveying
Supreme Court of Florida decisions during the 1980s which construed the state Bill of Rights).
72. FLA. CO NST. art. 1, § 23.
73. Hawkins, supra note 71, at 828.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the
Reality Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REV. 775 (1994) (examining cases in Florida from 1980-
1993 and concluding that, with the exception of the right to die, Florida's privacy amendment has
made little dent in the law). But see Hawkins, supra note 71, at 858 (concluding that Florida
Supreme Court decisions during the 1980s bode well in the 1990s for those looking to the Florida
Constitution as a source of personal protection).
76. See City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1995); In re Matter of
Patricia Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993); In re Guardianship of M. Browning, 568 So.
2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 150-51 (Fla. 1989); Winfield v. Div. of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Reg., 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
77. 627 So. 2d at 1215.
78. See id. at 1216.
79. See Final Judgment, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Case No. 91-3491
CA-01 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1991), at 3.
[Vol. 51:151
FLORIDA'S HOMOSEXUAL ADOPTION BAN
and then using the answer to prohibit all gays and lesbians from adopt-
ing. Arguing that Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution pro-
tects citizens against "government intrusion into his or her private life,"
Cox maintained that asking the question was the "intrusion."80
The appellate court further stated that the right of privacy applies to
"unwarranted governmental inquiry concerning private matters.""' The
court stated that Section 63.042(3) does not implicate this concern
because it "does not mandate any specific inquiry concerning an appli-
cant's background ... [because] the state did not demand secret infor-
mation; the plaintiffs voluntarily provided the information. 8 2
With this overly technical argument, the appellate court again
missed the point. By putting the question on the form, the state
demanded private information about the applicants' background. Fur-
ther, if Cox and Jackman had not answered the question, one of two
things would have happened-they would have been presumed to be
homosexual, or HRS would have specifically inquired as to their sexual
orientation. 3 Either way, the end result would have been the same:
they would have been denied consideration pursuant to the statute.
The court next reasoned that adoption is neither a private matter nor
a right, but rather a statutory privilege." In applying to adopt, the appli-
cants sought the state's determination that, in the best interests of the
child, adoption is appropriate. This determination necessarily involves
extensive investigation and examination of the background of the pro-
spective parents.8 5 The court noted that "[m]any private decisions indi-
rectly limit one's ability to obtain statutory privileges [, but] ... indirect
limitations do not render statutory privileges unconstitutional under the
right of privacy. '"86
With this argument, the court did two things. First, by admitting
that homosexuality is a "private decision," the court undercut its earlier
statement that the statute does not compel inquiry into private matters.
Second, the court mixed the due process issue with the right of privacy
argument. Respondents (plaintiffs below) did not argue that investiga-
tions violated the right of privacy, but rather that they implicated the
80. Initial Brief for Petitioner, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d
902 (Fla. 1995), at 15.
81. 627 So. 2d at 1216 (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
82. Id.
83. It is possible that HRS would not have inquired further, and that Cox and Jackman, by
leaving the question blank, could have been allowed to adopt despite their homosexuality.
However, the couple would have put themselves at risk of having the adoption overturned later for
perjuring themselves during the proceedings.




UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
right of privacy and, therefore, strict scrutiny should apply. Strict scru-
tiny would require the state to prove that it has a compelling state inter-
est, and that it was using the least intrusive means to achieve that
interest. Further, respondents argued that the inquiry, combined with the
irrebuttable presumption of unfitness to adopt if the applicant answered
that he or she was homosexual, violated the right of privacy and due
process.8 7 The privacy intrusion-asking the question on the adoption
application-triggers the due process violation-the blanket exclusion
from further consideration without any investigation into the applicant's
parenting ability if the applicant declares his/her homosexuality.
The appellate court's conclusion that the right of privacy was not
implicated is significant. Because Florida's right of privacy is a funda-
mental right, if the court had found the right implicated, the court would
have applied strict scrutiny in its due process and equal protection analy-
ses. The court correctly noted that the "best interests of the child can
create a very substantial state interest.188 But, the means must be least
intrusive and related to the end, and Florida's adoption procedures
already provide means for carefully screening applicants.
B. Due Process
The United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution limit
due process to protection against deprivations of "life, liberty or prop-
erty." 89 Plaintiffs argued that the statute invoked an interest in liberty. 9°
The appellate court, however, refused to extend the concept of liberty
beyond a person's physical freedom.9 The court reasoned that liberty
interests not involving physical freedom must be "fundamental liberties"
to be protected by the due process clauses.92 The court concluded that
due process was not implicated because neither the opportunity to adopt
nor the decision to engage in homosexual activity were fundamental
liberties.93
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, petitioners (plaintiffs
below) argued that the statute violated the right to due process by creat-
ing an irrebutable preseumption that homosexuals are unfit parents.94
87. See Initial Brief for Petitioner, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So.
2d 902 (Fla. 1995), at 12-16, 39-42.
88. 627 So. 2d at 1216.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
90. See Initial Brief for Petitioner, 656 So. 2d 902, at 40.
91. See 627 So. 2d at 1217.
92. See id. The court reasoned that "fundamental liberties" include those implicit in our
concept of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in history and tradition. Id. (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)).
93. See 627 So. 2d at 1217.
94. See Initial Brief for Petitioner, 656 So.2d 902, at 39-42.
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For a long time, both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Florida have disfavored irrebutable statutory presumptions. 95
The majority of the supreme court, without addressing the petition-
ers' assertion, affirmed the appellate court's ruling on this issue. In dis-
sent, however, Justice Kogan argued that the statute did implicate due
process guarantees.96 Justice Kogan stated that "[a]s a general rule, a
statute irrational under an equal protection analysis necessarily violates
due process, too."' 97 Justice Kogan raised three specific due process
issues. First, he pointed out that in oral argument, HRS conceded that it
does not question heterosexuals about sexual conduct unless the back-
ground investigation hints at improprieties.98 This is important because
the sole support for HRS's due process defense was that homosexual
acts violate a Florida statute making the commission of any "unnatural
and lascivious act with another person" a misdemeanor.99 Section
800.02 includes behavior other than homosexual activity, yet the state
made no argument as to why it only targeted homosexual activity. 100
In addition, Justice Kogan argued that Florida caselaw failed to
support HRS's construction of Section 800.02, as the supreme court and
appellate courts had only applied the statute to public acts or non-con-
sensual sexual assaults.' "Because the language of section 800.02
neither exempts heterosexuals nor applies exclusively to homosexuals,
.. . private consensual acts by homosexuals [ ] would not fall within
section 800.02. " 102 This raises a valid due process issue as to whether
HRS's construction of the section violates constitutional guarantees.
The second due process issue pointed out by Justice Kogan is that
while Florida prohibits homosexuals from even applying to adopt chil-
dren, the state imposes no similar per se exclusion on convicted felons
or persons listed on the Child Abuse Registry.10 3 Rather, the state has
expressly established administrative procedures for screening such
applicants. 1' 4 Thus, if HRS were concerned about a consistent scheme
95. See id. at 39-40 (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976)).
96. See 656 So. 2d at 903-05 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. (". . . a statute irrational under equal protection has no lawful purpose; and we
elsewhere have noted that an improper purpose means the statute violates substantive due
process") (citing Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla.
1991)).
98. See id. at 904.
99. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1995).
100. See 656 So. 2d at 904, n.2.
101. See id. at 904 (noting that no Florida case exists which holds private, nonharmful
consensual acts violative of section 800.02).
102. Id. at 905.
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 1OM-8.00513 (1991)).
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for protecting children, either these groups also would be excluded or
homosexuals would be similarly screened.' 05
The differential treatment of felons and child abusers on one hand
and homosexuals on the other raises a serious substantive due process
question. It suggests that the state is completely denying gays access
to any meaningful legal process, even the intensive scrutiny reserved
for felons and child abusers. Before the State can deny due process
in this manner, it must at least advance a legitimate reason for doing
so based in fact and empirical study. Here, HRS has advanced no
such reason.... [n]or did the district court below cite to any material
to justify its unsupported conclusion to the contrary.' 0 6
Finally, Justice Kogan pointed out that HRS did not follow proper
policy-making procedures in creating its definition of "homosexual"-
merely inventing it after Cox filed the lawsuit.'0 7 Florida cases require
that an incipient rule be created in a proper administrative hearing,' but
the parties apparently failed to raise the issue below. Nonetheless, as
Justice Kogan pointed out, Florida's blanket exclusion of gay and les-
bian adults from adoption raised several due process issues left
unresolved by the court.
C. Equal Protection
The Florida Constitution's equal protection clause guarantees that
"all natural persons are equal before the law."10 9 Government regula-
tions challenged as violating equal protection are subject to either "strict
scrutiny" or "rational basis" review. If they infringe upon a fundamental
right or target a suspect class, they are subject to strict scrutiny and will
only be upheld if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est." ' If they do not implicate a fundamental right or target a suspect
class, they only need to be rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose." '
The trial court ruled that homosexuals are a suspect class and that
the fundamental right of privacy was implicated, requiring application of
105. It is ironic that the HRS procedures are more stringent against homosexuals, who have no
proven record of harming children, than they are against child abusers who have been proven to
have harmed children in the past.
106. 656 So. 2d at 905.
107. See id. at 905.
108. See id. (citing Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Public Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280
(Fla. 1980)).
109. FLA. CONST., art. I, § 2.
110. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); De Ayala
v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989).
111. See id.
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strict scrutiny. 12 The trial court also concluded that even under a
rational basis test, the statute was unconstitutional because there is "no
rational basis to ban all homosexuals ... from adopting any child." '113
The court noted that although rational basis review creates a presump-
tion of constitutionality, the plaintiffs overcame the presumption with
"objective evidence," while the state "failed to introduce anything
except pure speculation." ' 4
The appellate court, however, concluded that strict scrutiny did not
apply because homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class and the
fundamental right of privacy was not implicated." 5 The appellate court
concluded its analysis by applying rational basis review to the equal
protection challenge, holding that the statute violated neither the United
States Constitution nor the Florida Constitution.
1 6
The appellate court concluded that:
... legislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational
relationship to the State's objectives [and] . . . should not be over-
turned 'unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is
so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate pur-
poses that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were
irrational."' 7
The court correctly stated that the state has a legitimate purpose in
providing for the best interests of children in need of adoption."' The
court then reasoned that because many adopted children would develop
heterosexual preferences, they would need education and guidance after
puberty concerning relationships.'t 9 As society expects parents to pro-
vide that information, and because adopted children tend to have addi-
tional developmental problems arising from adoption, the court
concluded that it was more important for adopted children to have heter-
112. See Final Judgment, Cox v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., Case No. 91-3491
CA-01 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1991), at 9-12.
113. Id. at 9.
114. Id.
115. See 627 So. 2d at 1215-20. For discussions supporting homosexuality "suspect class"
status, see Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1985); Harris M. Miller II, An Argument for the
Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality,
57 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 797 (1984).
116. See 627 So. 2d at 1218. The Florida Constitution provides: "All natural persons are
equal before the law .... FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. The United States Constitution provides: "[No
state] shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
117. Id. (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (citations omitted)).
118. See 627 So. 2d at 1220.
119. See id.
19961
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
osexual parents.1 20 As previously discussed, however, social science
research suggests the courts' reasoning is flawed.1 21
The Supreme Court of Florida remanded the case on this issue,
finding the record insufficient to determine whether the statute could be
sustained under the equal protection challenge.1 22 This may suggest that
an equal protection challenge has the greatest likelihood of success when
the court next considers the issue. It should be noted, however, that the
Supreme Court apparently agreed with the appellate court that the
rational basis standard should be applied.1 23
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the importance of Cox as a case of first impression, the
courts' opinions leave issues unresolved. Three possible explanations
for the courts' treatment of the issues and the evidence exist. First, the
opinions may reflect intentional sidestepping of the issues. Second, they
may reflect genuine deference to the legislature for resolution of this
sociopolitical and legal question. For example, the Second District
Court of Appeal noted that perhaps the "legislature should revisit this
issue in light of the research that has taken place in the last fifteen
years." 1 24 However, deference to the legislature should not preclude the
judiciary from performing its function.1 25 Finally, these opinions may
reflect that within the state's judiciary which, like much of society, has
been historically hostile toward lesbian and gay issues, myths and mis-
conceptions linger.12 6
Regardless of the reason(s) for the court's treatment of the issues,
Florida's gay exclusion statute raises serious due process and equal pro-
tection issues. Further, from the child's point of view, the sexual orien-
tation of the parent is largely irrelevant. The unanimity with which
studies have found absolutely no harm to children raised by homosexual
parents is overwhelming and undeniable. Since the primary goal of
adoption is to secure suitable and loving homes for thousands of
unwanted or homeless children, Florida's gay exclusion statute seems
120. See id. at 1220.
121. See Riddle, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
122. See 656 So. 2d at 903.
123. See id.
124. 627 So. 2d at 1220.
125. Waiting for a legislative change of heart in a state that is growing increasingly hostile to
gay rights and issues would be folly. In 1993, first-term state Representative Suzanne Jacobs (D-
Delray Beach) introduced a bill to overturn the adoption ban, but no senator was willing to be a
sponsor, and consequently no hearing was held. See Freiberg, supra note 23, at 5 ("With Florida's
legislature dominated by conservatives, there was no chance this year that the bill would pass").
126. See Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Roadblock, 5 Crv.
LIBERTIEs REv. 19 (1979).
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completely contradictory to the "best interests of the child" standard.
Thus, courts should reject unfounded assumptions about gay and lesbian
adults and decide the appropriateness of adoption on a case-by-case
basis, as is otherwise mandated by the Florida Adoption Act. The
Supreme Court of Florida has temporarily left the status of homosexu-
als' adoption privilege unresolved. The issue will resurface, however,
giving the court another opportunity to confront it.1 27
TIFFANI G. LEE
127. After the case was remanded, Cox decided to abandon the suit, but a lesbian woman has
reactivated a previously-filed suit in Broward County. See Jaime Abdo, Lesbian Leads Battle to
Adopt, SUN-SEwrn.L, Dec. 18, 1995, at B3.
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